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Abstract
We explore the question of whether machines can infer information about our psy-
chological traits or mental states by observing samples of our behaviour gathered 
from our online activities. Ongoing technical advances across a range of research 
communities indicate that machines are now able to access this information, but the 
extent to which this is possible and the consequent implications have not been well 
explored. We begin by highlighting the urgency of asking this question, and then 
explore its conceptual underpinnings, in order to help emphasise the relevant issues. 
To answer the question, we review a large number of empirical studies, in which 
samples of behaviour are used to automatically infer a range of psychological con-
structs, including affect and emotions, aptitudes and skills, attitudes and orientations 
(e.g. values and sexual orientation), personality, and disorders and conditions (e.g. 
depression and addiction). We also present a general perspective that can bring these 
disparate studies together and allow us to think clearly about their philosophical and 
ethical implications, such as issues related to consent, privacy, and the use of per-
suasive technologies for controlling human behaviour.
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1 Introduction
Recent news stories have brought to the public’s attention a research trend that has 
been developing for several years across different research communities, and which 
is aimed at providing machines with the capability to infer information about the 
mental states and psychological traits of their users.1
However, the controversial technology behind these announcements is represent-
ative of a wider set of research interests than is captured by any specific news story, 
and is carried out for very different reasons by different scientific communities. A 
key observation, which motivates our enquiry, is that data scientists have come to 
discover that people leak personal information during online interactions with intel-
ligent systems (i.e. “digital footprints”), which can then be used to train machine 
learning (ML) algorithms to infer information about the mental states and psycho-
logical traits of human users (e.g. Kosinski et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2014; Yang and 
Srinivasan 2016). This observation has had profound effects.
In a review of how digital footprints can be used to predict personality traits, 
for example, Lambiotte and Kosinski (2014, p. 1934) state that the collection and 
analysis of human activities mediated by online platforms is “changing the para-
digm in the social sciences, as it undergoes a transition from small-scale studies, 
typically employing questionnaires or lab-based observations and experiments, to 
large-scale studies, in which researchers observe the behavior of thousands or mil-
lions of individuals and search for statistical regularities and underlying principles.” 
This is because the digital footprints left behind during our online interactions with 
intelligent systems can be treated as samples of behaviour, and in turn used to infer 
additional psychological information about each individual, under certain conditions 
outlined later in this paper (Sect.  3).2 There are now vast datasets of such behav-
ioural samples, which are gathered from online repositories, social media APIs, or 
IoT enabled devices (among other sources), and which make these studies possible.
Furthermore, in addition to their scientific interest, the types of studies that Lam-
biotte and Kosinski (2014) allude to, are also of interest to businesses, governments 
and society, more generally. For example, as Matz et  al. (2017) have shown, the 
automated detection of personality traits by ML algorithms, can also be used to tai-
lor persuasive messages that demonstrably increase the chance of a user clicking on 
an online advertisement and purchasing a product. As such, there is a clear finan-
cial incentive for businesses and organisations to implement and deploy some of the 
methods detailed in these studies, connecting further communities to the ongoing 
2 As we discuss later (Sect. 4.3), each of these samples of behaviour could also be potentially considered 
as an item in a psychometric test.
1 For example, MIT Technology Review reported on how smartphones can be used to predict scores in 
tests designed to assess cognitive function (Metz 2018), and The Guardian provided extensive cover-
age on the use of psychographic modelling for use in election campaigning and marketing (Hern 2018). 
This development followed on from public backlash towards the use of similar technologies by Facebook 
(Rosenberg et al. 2018), as identified by an article that a research team at Facebook released describing 
the ability to manipulate the emotional states of users (Kramer et al. 2014), and also hinted at in a patent 
filing (Nowak & Eckles 2014).
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research and technological developments. However, these incentives may not nec-
essarily align with the interests of individuals and society more generally, raising 
important social, legal and ethical questions (Wachter and Mittelstadt, Forthcom-
ing). An obvious example in this regards is the use of psychometric data to influence 
political campaigning (Hern 2018), and the continued rise of so-called ‘neuropoli-
tics’ (Schreiber 2017; Svoboda 2018). Even if the effects of these techniques are 
sometimes overstated by companies trying to market their latest product, the poten-
tial risks involved justify the ongoing analysis and scrutiny of these technological 
developments.
Therefore, it is worth reflecting on what information we reveal during our online 
interactions, as well as how much of this information can be used by intelligent sys-
tems to ‘read our minds’. This is important, because no business invests money into 
large-scale behaviour monitoring for the sake of merely knowing more about their 
users. Rather, the process of inferring psychological information is often to improve 
the accuracy of consequential decisions made by autonomous intelligent systems 
about how best to predict, persuade, and ultimately control the behaviour of the user.
In light of this interest, the current paper explores a central question that underlies 
the aforementioned technical developments and news announcements, and which 
may not be immediately clear to all of the communities involved:
Can machines infer (probabilistic) information about the psychological traits 
and mental states of individual users, on the basis of samples of their behav-
iour?
This question is replete with many thorny philosophical and methodological issues, 
which we wish to avoid in order to focus on other matters.3 Therefore, in Sect. 2, 
we begin by unpacking and clarifying what is meant by the question, before detail-
ing two case studies of influential technologies at the heart of recent advances. In 
order to address this question, in Sect.  3, we present an overview of a significant 
portion of the scientific literature, across a range of different research communities, 
and identify 17 categories of psychological constructs, which can be inferred (to 
varying degrees) by machines on the basis of a variety of samples of behaviour or 
other observable quantity. We present 26 studies that have explored these various 
3 An important clarificatory note, however, is that while we refer to psychological traits and mental 
states in our question, our review in fact encompasses a wider range of theoretical constructs (e.g. politi-
cal orientation and skills or abilities). In general, psychological traits differ from mental states in the 
sense that the former are typically treated as dispositions that affect behaviour but which are relatively 
stable over time (i.e. personality traits), whereas states tend to be more transitory (e.g. particular emo-
tions). We sometimes refer to only one of these terms (i.e. ‘trait’ or ‘state’), unless the context requires 
more specificity, in which case the relevant theoretical term is employed. In other cases, we use the more 
general term ‘psychological construct’ when we need to refer to the full set our review covers (also see 
footnote 6). We acknowledge that our grouping together of these constructs, and indeed our treatment of 
them as psychological constructs, is far from being theoretically uncontroversial. However, our primary 
aim in this paper is to better understand and draw attention to an emerging methodology in computer sci-
ence (and related disciplines), rather than to take a substantive position on the nature of theoretical enti-
ties such as psychological traits.
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constructs, and highlight the types of behavioural samples that can be used to infer 
information pertaining to them.
The purpose of this review is to better understand the extent to which autonomous 
intelligent systems can influence and shape our behaviour, but we do not attempt 
to offer a systematic meta-analysis of a specific literature (see Sect.  3.1). Instead, 
we are primarily interested in understanding what kind of psychological informa-
tion can be inferred on the basis of our online activities, and whether an intelligent 
system could use this information to improve its ability to subsequently steer our 
behaviour towards its own goals. Therefore, it is sufficient for our purposes to sim-
ply note an emerging theme that has begun to appear across a wide range of studies 
and across a wide range of different communities.
In Sect. 4, we discuss the findings of our review, building on earlier work that 
presented a conceptual framework for understanding and analysing the interactions 
between autonomous intelligent systems and human users (Burr et al. 2018).4 In this 
earlier paper, we employed the language of control theory to frame our discussion. 
The basic notion of control theory, the feedback loop, tells us that when a controller 
(e.g. an autonomous intelligent system) has access to information about the state of 
a controlled system (e.g. a human user), then it can choose appropriate actions to 
govern that state. We can break this feedback loop into two parts: a) the observa-
tional component, where a controlling agent can monitor the state (e.g. mental state) 
of a controlled user, and b) the action component, where the controlling agent can 
make decisions, conditional upon the observed state and its own goals, in order to 
steer the behaviour of the controlled user.
In (Burr et al. 2018), we focused on the part of the feedback loop concerned with 
actions taken by the controlling agent (i.e. an intelligent system). Specifically, we 
discussed the risks entailed in cases when the values and goals that drive the deci-
sions of an intelligent system are misaligned with our own, and the risk of posi-
tive feedback loops emerging and leading to unintended consequences (e.g. political 
polarisation or behavioural addiction). This article focuses on the other component 
of the feedback loop: the observational component. Our review is designed to help 
demonstrate the types of mental states and psychological traits that intelligent sys-
tems can now detect, with the subsequent aim being to explore how the increas-
ing ability for intelligent systems to ‘read our minds’ may alter the dynamics of the 
aforementioned feedback loop.5
By framing our discussion in terms of control theory and bounded rationality, 
we are able to highlight important philosophical and ethical questions, such as 
whether implied consent is sufficient in situations where it is unclear what psycho-
logical information can be inferred from our online behaviour, and how user’s trust 
5 Although this work develops and extends upon earlier research, we also believe there is intrinsic value 
in discussing the article’s central question for its own sake. Therefore, although we would encourage the 
reader to explore this paper’s findings alongside the earlier framework, the two articles can be read inde-
pendently of one another.
4 In our (2018) paper, we refer to intelligent systems as ‘Intelligent Software Agents’, developing on the 
standard definition of learning agent defined by Russell and Norvig (2010). Rather than motivating the 
use of the term ‘agent’ in this paper, we have chosen to simply adopt the former label instead.
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is impacted by the respective technological developments (Sect. 4.2). These ques-
tions are especially important given recent research findings (discussed in Sect. 4.2), 
which demonstrate the surprising scope of behavioural data that is collected from 
our smartphones during everyday activities (Schmidt 2018).
Finally, we also discuss, briefly, how the technological developments explored in 
this paper will likely impact the development of the behavioural sciences, most nota-
bly psychometrics (Sect. 4.3).
2  Unpacking the Question
The title of this article is informally ‘can machines read our mind?’, but in order for 
this question to be well-posed it requires some unpacking. The following definitions 
help clarify our framing:
• Our use of the term ‘machine’ refers to algorithms, and more specifically, to 
those machines that can learn (i.e. improve performance on a task) from data 
(i.e. experience). These systems are the object of study in the field of machine 
learning (Mitchell 1997).
• By ‘mind’ we mean the set of psychological constructs for any given individual, 
which typically fall within the remit of psychometrics, and partially determine 
the subject’s observable behaviour.
• By ‘psychological construct’, we limit ourselves to the sub-case of theoretical 
constructs that are currently measured by various psychometric assessments, or 
may result from a medical diagnosis.6
• By ‘read’ we mean the ability to (probabilistically) infer or predict some infor-
mation pertaining to the postulated psychological construct, based on a sample 
of the subject’s observable behaviour.
• By ‘samples of behaviour’ we mean the observation of any actions of the user or 
their interactions with the machine.
Therefore, a more precise formulation of the question is, ‘can machines infer (prob-
abilistic) information about the psychological constructs of individual users, on 
the basis of samples of behaviour?’7 Ultimately, this is a problem of inference: to 
know something without direct observation, on the basis of its effects. As such it 
can be modelled mathematically as an inverse problem, which is studied in various 
6 In psychometrics, the target of measurement is a postulated psychological construct, which is defined 
and delineated in relation to the process of measurement. The process of construct validation, includ-
ing its epistemological and metaphysical assumptions (see Alexandrova 2017; Borsboom 2005 for help-
ful discussions), is complicated and beyond the scope of this paper—though we do say a bit about the 
process in Sect. 4.3. We focus on psychometrics in this paper because it is the science of psychological 
measurement.
7 We are not interested in whether a machine can determine the ‘content of our thoughts’, though some 
have begun working on this (e.g. Shen et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2017).
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disciplines (e.g. reconstructing a 3D shape based on a 2D projection is an example 
of an inverse problem commonly solved in radiography), and is a typical focus of 
ML.
In addressing this question, there are two further issues we wish to sidestep, but 
which it is worth saying something briefly about here. Firstly, by employing terms 
such as ‘psychological trait’ or ‘mental state’, we do not wish to take a stand on 
debates in related areas such as philosophy of mind about the nature or existence 
of such psychological constructs. For example, situationists (and to some extent 
interactionists) will find much to disagree with in the literature we survey, and these 
debates have well known consequences for related discussions in moral philosophy 
(Harman 1999). However, for the purpose of this paper we wish to sidestep these 
concerns in order to focus more specifically on uncovering an important methodol-
ogy that is emerging in the computer sciences.8
Secondly, and relatedly, we do not discuss well-studied theoretical procedures in 
psychological assessment such as construct validation (Rust and Golombok 2009; 
Alexandrova and Haybron 2016). Instead, we ask if the outcome of certain psycho-
logical assessments can reliably be predicted by a machine based on samples of user 
behaviour, thereby bypassing the need for administering the original assessment. 
This approach was taken in a study, which administered a series of psychometric 
tests to a large number of Facebook users, and then used ML algorithms to learn 
how to map their online data to the outcome of the respective tests (Kosinski et al. 
2013). Here also, the question of construct validity was bypassed, and the algorithm 
predicted whatever the authors of the original test considered as a ‘latent psycholog-
ical trait’. This study is representative of a research trend being conducted by many 
different communities (often independently), which collectively allows us to address 
the above question. To further understand the nature of this question, we explore this 
study in more detail, alongside a further case study that also represents an example 
of an emerging methodology being utilised across the aforementioned communi-
ties.9 It is our hope that with this methodology clearly laid out, philosophers will 
be able to engage with the material and perhaps develop on some of the underlying 
theoretical assumptions that pertain to debates such as those mentioned above.
2.1  Case Study 1: MyPersonality
Social media platforms have been interested in the possibility of inferring private 
psychological traits from samples of users’ behaviour for a while, as evidenced 
by a patent filed by Facebook in 2012, and subsequently granted in 2014, which 
8 As one tangential remark, however, it is interesting to note that some studies in areas such as HCI and 
affective computing do note the importance of situational and contextual factors in inferring psychologi-
cal traits and mental states (e.g. Baras 2016; Freitas 2017), and see developments in ubiquitous comput-
ing (e.g. IoT devices) as promising developments for improving our ability to accurately incorporate this 
type of contextualising data.
9 Both of the techniques discussed in the following two case studies have been influential across a wide-
range of communities, as will become evident in the review Sect. (3.2). It is for this reason that they have 
been selected.
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explored the possibility of determining user personality traits on the basis of their 
social media activity (Nowak & Eckles 2014). However, the techniques by which 
this is possible were made clear to the public following the publication of (Kosin-
ski et al. 2013).
This paper provided details of an application (MyPersonality), developed by 
researchers at the University of Cambridge, which allowed Facebook users to 
participate in a range of psychometric tests, including: a 20-item version of the 
IPIP (5-factor personality) test; a 20-item version of Raven’s Standard Progres-
sive Matrices (Intelligence) test; and a 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale test.
Following the tests, users were asked if they were happy for their profile infor-
mation to be collected for research purposes. This information included, but is 
not limited to:
• 55,814 possible “Likes” recorded and decomposed (using Singular Value 
Decomposition) into a 100-component vector for each user (n = 58,466);
• The user’s age, gender, sexual orientation, relationship status, political views, 
religion, and social network information (e.g. network density), if recorded by 
the user;
• Details of the users’ consumption of alcohol, drugs, and cigarettes and whether 
a user’s parents stayed together until the user was 21 years old (recorded using 
online surveys); and
• Visual inspection of profile pictures, in order to assign ethnicity to a randomly 
selected subsample of users.
In order to predict the user’s psychological traits, a combination of linear regres-
sion and logistic regression algorithms were used (both with 10-fold cross valida-
tion), in order to predict numerical variables (e.g. score for ‘openness’ trait) and 
binary variables (e.g. gender) respectively. These methods enabled the research-
ers to predict various psychological traits and demographic information with dif-
fering degrees of accuracy (details are reported in Sect. 3).
The method and dataset that Kosinski et al. (2013) presented has subsequently 
been utilised by additional researchers, some of whom have used the dataset for 
different experiments (e.g. Boyd et al. 2015; Annalyn et al. 2018)—Sect. 3 will 
review some of these experiments in more detail.
An interesting point, raised by Kosinski et al. (2013), in their discussion, was 
that the “similarity between Facebook Likes and other widespread kinds of digi-
tal records, such as browsing histories, search queries, or purchase histories sug-
gests that the potential to reveal users’ attributes is unlikely to be limited to Likes. 
Moreover, the wide variety of attributes predicted in this study indicates that, 
given appropriate training data, it may be possible to reveal other attributes as 
well” (Kosinski et al. 2013, p. 5805).
The possibility of digital samples of behaviour revealing further (perhaps 
unknown) psychological traits of users is a primary motivation for this paper, and 
will be discussed further in Sect. 4.
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2.2  Case Study 2: LIWC
Another influential technology is the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC): a 
popular method in computational linguistics for inferring psychological information 
based on an individual’s language use (Pennebaker et al. 2015).
Development of LIWC began in the early 1990  s, taking advantage of modern 
computing and the rise of the internet (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010). The goal 
was to create a program that could look for and count words that belonged to “psy-
chology-relevant categories” at scale and across multiple text files (Tausczik and 
Pennebaker 2010, p. 27). After several iterations the product has evolved into a com-
prehensive software tool that contains over 6400 words. (Pennebaker et al. 2015).10
LIWC has two central features: (a) the processing component and (b) the dic-
tionary. The processing feature is a computer program, which opens a series of text 
files (e.g. essays, blogs, or novels) and counts each word in the file. The dictionary 
is organised into categories, which serve the purpose of scoring a text file for vari-
ous attributes (e.g. positive or negative emotion words; function words), as well as 
defining which of the target words in the file should be counted and which should be 
ignored. For example, ‘it’ is counted as an instance of a ‘function word’, a ‘pronoun’, 
and, more specifically, an ‘impersonal pronoun’. Each category is incremented when 
a member of the category is detected, and at the end, a score can be given that iden-
tifies the percentage of words in a text that are included within each of the hierarchi-
cally-organised categories.
The purpose of LIWC and its categories is to capture the language correlates 
of psychological traits or mental states such as attentional focus, emotional state, 
social relationships, and thinking styles (e.g. analytic use of distinctions, degree of 
cognitive complexity). For example, “[t]he function and emotion words people use 
provide important psychological cues to their thought processes, emotional states, 
intentions, and motivations” (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010, p. 37). There is now a 
huge amount of literature assessing the psychometric properties of LIWC.11
Evaluating the psychometric properties of LIWC is similar to standard psycho-
metric questionnaire evaluation, in that reliability and validity are assessed—word 
counts can be treated as responses, in the sense of item response theory (IRT) (see 
Sect.  4.3 for discussion). However, assessing the reliability of LIWC differs from 
traditional questionnaires, because an individual does not tend to use the same lan-
guage in multiple iterations (e.g. test-retest reliability). In terms of validation, a 
number of studies are worth mentioning:
• Kahn et al. (2007) assessed the construct validity of LIWC’s emotion categories 
(e.g. positive and negative emotions), and reports that LIWC appears to be “a 
valid method for measuring verbal expression of emotion”.
10 For an overview and introduction to LIWC, see (Pennebaker 2011).
11 A good starting point is (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010), which contains a large list of references for 
validation studies. Pennebaker et al. (2015) also provide an overview of the psychometric properties of 
the most recent release of LIWC (LIWC2015).
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• Alpers et al. (2005) found that LIWC ratings of positive and negative emotion 
words correspond with human ratings of writing excerpts.
• Mehl et  al. (2006) found that, in transcripts of spoken dialogue, higher word 
count and use of fewer large words (for both males and females) predicted extra-
version.
• Rude et al. (2004) found that individuals with depression are more likely to use 
an increased number of first-person singular and negative emotions words in 
emotional writings, than individuals who are not depressed.
LIWC is known as a ‘closed-dictionary’ approach, due to the fixed nature of its 
categories.12 As an example, LIWC “ignores context, irony, sarcasm, and idioms”, 
leading to codings of words such as ‘mad’ as instance of ‘anger’. However, as LIWC 
is a probabilistic system, the advent of big data techniques and large-scale content 
analysis means that many of these weaknesses can be mitigated with sufficiently 
large datasets. As such, LIWC is frequently used in ML studies (e.g. De Choudhury 
et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2014; Hao et al. 2014), and the increasing amount of publicly 
available web data offers new insights for the social sciences (Lazer et al. 2009)—
for example, computational methods, such as LIWC, may help to test the degree 
to which word use is contextual and whether particular findings hold with different 
groups across a wide range of domains.
Although we have focused on two case studies, it turns out that many different 
research communities have been interested in automating or bypassing psycho-
logical testing for a while. A non-exhaustive list would include communities such 
as: human-computer interaction, computational social science, digital humani-
ties, affective computing, psychoinformatics, health informatics, and many more.13 
While each of these communities may be interested in specific mental states (e.g. 
emotion in the case of affective computing), the general interest in inferring psycho-
logical information from samples of behaviour is common to all. This is important 
to note, because as the communities become increasingly integrated, it is possible 
that more can be achieved than could otherwise be done in isolation. As we demon-
strate in Sect. 4, the consequences of this raises important philosophical and ethical 
questions.
13 The HCI community routinely hold challenges for researchers, in which different teams compete to 
demonstrate the most effective method for automatically extracting relevant features from common data-
sets, across multiple modalities (e.g. extracting and predicting emotional content from audio, video etc.). 
Examples of these challenges include the International Workshop on Audio/Visual Emotion Challenge 
(component of the ACM Multimedia Conference) and the SemEval challenge. These workshops help 
to develop methodologies and techniques across domains such as signal detection theory, and therefore, 
even if one study only focuses on a specific area (e.g. predicting affective state from a video recording of 
an individual’s gait), the techniques can also serve to advance research in wider domains (e.g. identifica-
tion in surveillance systems).
12 See (Schwartz et al. 2013) for a discussion of closed- versus open-vocabulary approaches, including a 
consideration of LIWC.
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3  Machine Inference of Psychological Traits
In this section, we review 26 studies, across 17 categories, which goes some way to 
answering the question of whether machines infer (probabilistic) information about 
the psychological traits and mental states of individual users, on the basis of samples 
of their behaviour.
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of this review is to better understand a 
research trend that has emerged across a wide range of communities and to explore 
the philosophical and ethical consequences of the techniques being developed—
we see these consequences as demanding urgent attention and ongoing scrutiny, in 
order to meet the changing demands that arise from constant innovation. Therefore, 
although the review is non-systematic, and was not designed to meet the standards 
of a scientific meta-analysis or quantitative review, it is sufficient for our purposes to 
demonstrate the main characteristics of an emerging trend, which we aim to capture 
and formalise in the next section.
3.1  The General Format
The general process for these studies involves an algorithm having access both to 
samples of an individual’s behaviour and to a normative group of many individuals 
for whom both psychometric information and observable behaviour are known.14 It 
can be summarised as follows:
• A study takes the values of a measure of some theoretical construct (P) (e.g. 
a psychological trait). Typically, these values refer to the answers or score to a 
validated psychometric test. However, they may also represent a diagnosis in the 
case of psychopathologies (e.g. the binary classification representing the result 
of a diagnosis), as well as a range of additional self-reported labels (e.g. political 
or sexual orientation). These values represent the ‘ground truth’ for the subse-
quent experiment.
• The above values are paired with another set of values, which correspond to a 
measure of some set of observable behavioural samples (B).
• The set of pairs ⟨Pi, Bi⟩ , for each subject i in the study, comprises the labelled 
training data that is used as input to a machine-learning algorithm (A) (e.g. sup-
port vector machine). This training set plays a role that is analogous to a norma-
tive group in psychometrics (see footnote 10).
• The model that is the output of this process (M: B → P) is then used to predict, 
for a new subject s, their values for  Ps on the basis of  Bs.
14 The concept of a normative group (or, normative population) is a fundamental notion in modern psy-
chometrics. It enables the assessment of an individual to be compared relative to the performance of a 
wider population. As such, the existence of this reference group is what gives certain scales their mean-
ing (e.g. candidate X has an average score, relative to the results of the normative group) (see Rust and 
Golombok 2009, for an introduction to modern psychometrics).
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In a less formal manner, when an ML algorithm is trained on a set of values of 
psychological traits  (Pi) and a set of behavioural samples  (Bi), for a normative group 
that has undertaken a pre-existing psychological assessment, it can use this informa-
tion to infer the respective information about other individuals not in the original 
sample, thereby bypassing the need for all individuals to take the original assess-
ment. Although some of the studies in our review depart from this general process in 
specific ways, the perspective that this formal setting offers is nevertheless instruc-
tive for understanding the research being conducted and developed by many differ-
ent communities.
We organise our review according to the theoretical constructs that are both (a) 
the object of enquiry for the original psychological assessment, and (b) the target 
that the ML algorithm aims to predict on the basis of some sample(s) of behav-
iour. The 17 categories of theoretical constructs are organised into five parent cat-
egories: affect and emotion (Sect. 3.2.1), aptitudes and skills (Sect. 3.2.2), attitudes 
and orientations (Sect. 3.2.3), personality (Sect. 3.2.4), and disorders and conditions 
(Sect. 3.2.5).15 Across these categories, a broad range of behavioural signals were 
found to correlate with one or more of the subsequent constructs, including (but 
not limited to) visual signals (e.g. profile pictures; facial expressions), audio signals 
(e.g. paralinguistic features of speech), written text (e.g. social media posts, email 
communication), physiological signals (e.g. heart rate), and other samples of behav-
ioural signals (e.g. computer and smartphone usage, website choice, typing patterns, 
and social media “likes”).
By conducting this review, we do not wish to endorse or critically evaluate the 
studies themselves, though we present relevant metrics where possible.16 Further-
more, we accept that many of the studies could be improved, and that many of the 
reported measures of accuracy are currently insufficient to allow for practical appli-
cation of the relevant techniques. In spite of these limitations, some organisations 
have already begun trying to control user behaviour on the basis of the inferred 
information, which raises important ethical issues that we discuss in Sect.  4. As 
such, we believe it is imperative that we understand the scope of what is being 
researched, and the consequences of these communities increasingly converging.
3.2  The Review
3.2.1  Inferring Affect and Emotion
3.2.1.1 Discrete Emotions In affective science, we can distinguish two theories—
those which categorise emotions as basic or discrete [e.g. anger, fear, sadness, enjoy-
15 The organisation of these categories does not follow any specific taxonomy found within the existing 
psychological literature, but is designed to capture the broad interests of the relevant communities and 
studies that this review covers, while retaining an intuitively plausible grouping.
16 Where relevant, we present the metrics in the original form of the respective study, rather than 
attempting to translate into a common measure. Some of these measures or techniques may be unfamiliar 
to the wider audience. Where this is the case, we direct the interested reader to the respective study.
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ment, disgust and surprise (Ekman 1992)], and those which emphasise the affec-
tive (continuous) dimensions [e.g. valence and arousal (Russell 1980)] of emotions. 
Different methods are used depending on the theoretical assumptions made by the 
researchers conducting the study. For example, in the affective computing commu-
nity, a number of techniques have been developed for automated face analysis (AFA) 
(Cohn and de la Torre 2015). AFA can be used to extract ‘facial action units’—ana-
tomically-based descriptors of facial activity—from images or video. These action 
units can then be used as input for a sign-based measurement process to infer “basic 
emotions” such as amusement, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust, contempt, and 
embarrassment. This process is known as the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), 
and relevant manuals allow human observers to code action units and translate them 
into the emotional categories, such as basic (discrete) emotions (Ekman and Rosen-
berg 2005). However, there is also disagreement over how many distinct emotion 
categories should be represented by the relevant system (e.g. Du et al. 2014).
Study 1 Mavani et al. (2017) trained a convolutional neural network to bypass the 
FACS process, by removing the need for extracting action units. Their study found 
an overall test accuracy of 95.71% for their model when trained and tested on the 
Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010), but fell to 65.39% when attempting 
to generalise across datasets.17 Angry and sad faces were most likely to be confused, 
with a per-class accuracy of 46.27% each. Disgusted faces achieved the highest per-
class accuracy of 90.05%.
Study 2 Utilising a different method, Hu and Flaxman (2018) took user-tags (e.g. 
‘#happy’) from Tumblr, a social media site, as self-reports of emotional states, and 
combined these labels with corresponding images and text posted by the individ-
ual. 15 tags were selected, based on how frequently they occured in the posts and 
also whether they appeared in the PANAS-X psychometric scale (Watson and Clark 
1999). After filtering the initial dataset to only include posts with one of the 15 emo-
tional tags and the corresponding text and image, the authors were left with 256,897 
posts. These multimodal posts were initially processed separately, using a convolu-
tional neural network for the images and a combination of word embeddings and a 
long short-term memory neural network for the text. The output of these two com-
ponents was then fed into a further multimodal neural network, in order to classify 
the posts. Their model achieved a 72% accuracy during testing.
3.2.1.2 Affective Dimensions Many of the studies in affective computing that deal 
with the automatic prediction of affective dimensions face a similar problem to the 
FAC system above—the extraction of relevant features from multimedia such as 
speech and video recordings (sometimes referred to as ‘signal detection and process-
ing’).18
17 Dataset was split into 70% training, 15% validation and 15% test.
18 A number of informative review articles, discussing the automated extraction of emotion-content fea-
tures from images, video, speech recordings, and text can be found in (Calvo et al. 2015). The technical 
details are beyond the scope of this article.
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Study 3 Bone et al. (2012) present an unsupervised learning method for produc-
ing ratings of one affective dimension (arousal) through the extraction of salient 
prosodic features of speech recordings. They utilised four publicly available data-
bases containing speech recordings from acted and natural emotional conversations 
in German and English (see article for details regarding databases used), which had 
been rated along the arousal dimension in order to provide ground truth. They report 
that the Spearman’s rank correlation (and binary classification accuracy) achieved 
by their unsupervised learning method on the four arousal databases were: 0.62 
(73%), 0.77 (86%), 0.70 (82%), and 0.65 (73%).
Study 4 Karg et al. (2010) used an optical tracking system to record the gait of 
actors who had been asked to “feel angry, happy, neutral, or sad and to imagine a 
situation in which they feel a particular affect”. From these instructions, the authors 
split the database into two groups containing 520 strides for analyzing discrete 
affective states and 780 strides for analyzing affective dimensions. The gait patterns 
(embodied using a visually animated manikin model) were also evaluated by human 
raters who had to determine whether the stride expressed either a low, medium, 
or high level of pleasure, arousal, or dominance, on a five-item Likert scale. The 
study compares multiple feature extraction/reduction methods (e.g principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA), linear discriminant analysis), as well as multiple classification 
methods (e.g. Neural Network, Naive Bayes, Support Vector Machine). Using PCA 
to reduce the input to 15 features, the authors achieved the following mean accura-
cies for detecting person-dependent, discrete affective states (i.e. predicting affective 
states for individuals, rather than interindividual prediction): Neural Network (92%), 
Naive Bayes (92%), Support Vector Machine (95%). For person-dependant affective 
dimensions, they achieved the following accuracies (neural network without PCA): 
valence 88%; arousal (97%); dominance (96%).
3.2.1.3 Subjective Well‑Being Subjective well-being is a self-reported measure of 
how an individual evaluates their life or a specific life event (Diener 1984). Typically, 
it includes an affective component (i.e. frequent positive affect and infrequent nega-
tive affect) and a cognitive judgement (i.e. evaluation of life satisfaction).19 Psycho-
metric measures for these two components can be treated independently, or summed 
to produce an overall measure. There are over 1400 wellbeing and quality-of-life 
instruments, covering a range of sub-groups (e.g. different cultures, ages, contexts, 
etc.), including instruments that focus on negative aspects such as depression (see 
Sect. 3.2.5) (Calvo & Peters 2014).
Study 5 Hao et  al. (2014) showed how sets of features extracted from Chinese 
microblogging service Sina Weibo could be used to predict an individual’s score on 
these two components. The features included demographic information (e.g. gender, 
19 Although subjective well-being is widely assumed to be multidimensional, there is disagreement 
over just how many dimensions to include. Huppert et  al. (2013), for example, argues that ten factors 
are needed: competence, emotional stability, engagement, meaning, optimism, positive emotion, positive 
relationships, resilience, self-esteem, and vitality. The interested reader can see (Alexandrova 2017) for a 
helpful discussion on this issue.
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age, and location), behavioural signals (e.g. number of posts, privacy settings, length 
of nickname), and linguistic information obtained with a simplified Chinese version 
of LIWC (see Sect. 2.2). As with Case Study 1 (Kosinski et al. 2013), their subjects 
completed two questionnaires: the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS) 
(Watson and Clark 1999) and the psychological well-being scale (PWBS) (Ryff and 
Keyes 1995). The scores from these tests formed the labels used in the training data, 
and a number of ML algorithms were compared, with stepwise regression perform-
ing the best. They found that by using a combination of demographic, behavioural 
and linguistic information, their predictions achieved a Pearson’s Correlation Coef-
ficient of 0.45 for positive affect, 0.27 for negative affect, and a mean of 0.45 for 
psychological wellbeing.
3.2.2  Inferring Aptitudes and Skills
3.2.2.1 General Intelligence General intelligence is a psychometric factor that sum-
marises correlations between an individual’s proficiency across a range of cognitive 
abilities. The factor was originally proposed by Charles Spearman in the early 20th 
century, and is still explored in modern psychometrics (Rust and Golombok 2009).
Study 6 In addition to the other psychological traits already discussed, Kosinski 
et al. (2013) also found correlations between social media “likes” and general intel-
ligence. They measured subjects’ general intelligence using a 20-item version of 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices—a nonverbal multiple choice test. Using lin-
ear regression, they found that an individual’s “likes” showed a correlation of 0.39 
with their scores on the above test. They also state that of these, “the best predictors 
of high intelligence include “Thunderstorms,” “The Colbert Report,” “Science,” and 
“Curly Fries”” (Kosinski et al. 2013, p. 5804).
3.2.2.2 Writing Ability Automated assessment of educational tests has been eagerly 
pursued since the advent of computers, and many companies offer software that claim 
to be able to replace the need for human markers. In cases where the test is multiple 
choice, the process is relatively straightforward, but written essays pose a greater 
challenge, due to the more holistic manner in which human graders tend to evaluate 
a student’s ability.
Study 7 The Education Testing Service (ETS) developed the e-rater system for 
automated assessment of a student’s writing ability (Attali and Burnstein 2005). The 
system uses natural language processing techniques (see Burnstein et  al. 2003) to 
extract features from essays, which include ‘word choice’ (e.g. relative occurrence 
of words; word length), ‘grammatical conventions’ (e.g. rates of errors, spelling, 
punctuation), ‘fluency and organization’ (e.g. use of passive voice, repetition of 
words, essay structure) and ‘topical vocabulary usage’ (assessed against a norma-
tive group of high-scoring essays on similar topics). These features can be used to 
train a linear regression model to find the optimal weights for each of the features 
(combined with some fixed weights), which best predict the score of trained human 
readers (scoring according to grade-specific rubrics). The performance metric Attali 
and Burnstein (2005) choose to emphasise is the test-retest reliability for individual 
essays (across multiple grades), as they were attempting to bypass the assessment 
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of human raters (assumed to have low inter-rater reliability). Overall, across 1987 
essays, the e-rater system (0.60) outperforms individual single human raters (0.50) 
and a combined average from two human raters (0.58).
3.2.2.3 Verbal Fluency Verbal fluency tests aim to measure the ease with which a 
person can produce words, and are used in clinical batteries to diagnose cognitive 
disorders associated with aphasia (e.g. Alzheimer’s) and guide neuropsychological 
investigation (e.g. possible lesions in frontal cortex impacting executive functioning).
Study 8 Jimison et  al. (2008) developed a computer assessment for measur-
ing verbal fluency, based around a simple game in which subjects are required to 
come up with as many words as possible from a series of letters. To test the system, 
they administered a neuropsychological battery to 30 elderly participants (average 
age 80.4) who had played their computer game over the course of 1  year.20 This 
score was used as the basis for a linear regression algorithm based on derived fea-
tures extracted from the game logs (e.g. average time and word complexity). They 
reported a correlation of 0.459  (R2) with the original tests.
3.2.3  Inferring Attitudes and Orientations
3.2.3.1 Values According to Schwartz’s theory of Basic Human Values, individuals 
have a set of values (i.e interlinked, abstract ideas that are judged to be desirable and 
important) and trans-situational goals that motivate their behaviour (Schwartz 2003). 
The theory postulates ten universal values across five dimensions, which are assumed 
to be recognisable across cultures—making it useful for intercultural research.
Study 9 A research team from IBM recruited 799 participants from the social 
media site Reddit (Chen et al. 2014), each of whom were required to complete the 
Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ)—a 21-item test, using a 6-point Likert scale, 
which measures an individual’s value orientations (Schwartz 2003). Using LIWC 
to extract word categories from the user’s posts on Reddit, the authors performed 
a regression analysis on the extracted categories and questionnaire scores (one per 
dimension), and found a range of correlations  (R2) between the regressed scores and 
the actual scores (as measured by the PVQ) from 0.39 (self-transcendence) to 0.41 
(openness-to-change and hedonism).
Study 10 Boyd et al. (2015) tested whether values extracted using a topic-model-
ling technique [meaning extracting method (MEM) (Chung and Pennebaker 2008)], 
which allows researchers to automatically discover relevant words that repeat-
edly co-occur across a corpus, predicted an individual’s scores on the Schwartz 
Value Survey (SVS) (Schwartz 1992). Participants were recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk,21 and required to complete the SVS, as well as provide free-form 
responses to two questions asking the subject to reflect on their personal values and 
behaviours. 16 themes associated with values (e.g. faith, growth, indulgence) and 27 
themes associated with behaviour (e.g. fiscal concerns, time awareness, relaxation) 
20 The authors do not provide details for which neuropsychological battery they used.
21 https ://www.mturk .com/.
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were extracted from the texts using the above natural language processing tech-
niques. In two studies—the second performed using a subset of the MyPersonality 
dataset (Kosinski et al. 2013)—the authors found mostly weak correlations between 
the extracted topics and the scores derived from the SVS (the majority of  R2 correla-
tions were < 0.04).22
3.2.3.2 Sexual Orientation As with other examples in this review, the ‘ground truth’ 
for sexual orientation is simply the self-report of the individual concerned, which 
may not necessarily be accurate (Kosinski et al. 2015). Nevertheless, assuming the 
accuracy of these self-reports, some studies have demonstrated that it may be pos-
sible to predict sexual orientation through the use of alternative digital footprints.23
Study 11 As we discussed in Case Study 1 Kosinski et al. (2013) predicted a range 
of attributes pertaining to individuals (including sexual orientation, i.e. homosexual 
or heterosexual), from the set of their Facebook “likes”. Using logistic regression, 
they found that the prediction accuracy (expressed by the area under receiver operat-
ing characteristic curve (AUC) coefficient) for males was 88% and for females was 
75%.
Study 12 In a more recent study with Yilun Wang (2018), Michal Kosinski has 
also used a deep neural network (VGG-Face) to extract facial features from a set 
of profile photos taken from an online dating site and convert them into 4096 vari-
ables. These variables, along with the self-reported sexual orientation of the dating 
site users, can then be used to train a logistic regression analysis to correctly classify 
sexual orientation with a similar level of accuracy to the previous study (81% for 
men and 71% for women, also expressed using the AUC coefficient).
3.2.3.3 Political Orientation Big data and ML have been used in election campaigns 
in the US since at least 2008 (Issenberg 2012), but typically the information used was 
restricted to traditional forms of demographic data. More recently, we have begun 
to see increasing interest in groups inferring political orientations on the basis of 
social media information, due to the value this information has for election cam-
paigns (Rosenberg et al. 2018).
Study 13 Cohen and Ruths (2013) collected hashtags from 2496 Twitter users, 
segmented into three groups (and three corresponding datasets): (a) politicians affil-
iated with a political party (n = 397), where the label was obvious (i.e. ‘Republican’ 
or ‘Democrat’); (b) politically active users with self-reported affiliation in profile 
(n = 1837); and (c) politically modest users (n = 262) who were categorised by mul-
tiple Mechanical Turk workers (for inter-rater agreement). The collected hashtags 
(1000 most recent for each individual) were used to construct feature vectors to 
train a Support Vector Machine. Average accuracies for 10-fold cross validation 
22 The authors also compared the extracted values and SVS scores with reported behaviours, in order 
to test whether there was a closer link between either the open- or closed-form assessments and an indi-
vidual’s self-report of relevant behaviours (see Boyd et al. 2015 for details).
23 In both instances, the authors have highlighted the significant ethical implications that these technolo-
gies could pose for the privacy and safety of the individuals concerned.
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were reported as 91% (politicians), 84% (politically-active), and 68% (politically 
modest).24
3.2.3.4 Brand Perception Neuromarketing uses research from neuroscience and psy-
chology in an attempt to gain commercially valuable insights into consumer experi-
ence, and to understand how an individuals purchasing behaviour could be predicted 
on the basis of neuroimaging data (Ariely and Berns 2010). A fundamental aspect of 
this area is inferring traits related to how individuals perceive and respond to various 
stimuli from potential advertising campaigns.
Study 14 Wei et  al. (2018) used electroencephalography (EEG) data collected 
from 30 male participants while watching 4–5 adverts randomly selected from a pos-
sible set of 220. The participants were also required to complete a proprietary ques-
tionnaire consisting of a mixture of Likert-based items and binary items, for each of 
the products advertised. The questionnaire was designed to measure attitudes related 
to brand perception, and was based on a consumer experience model that empha-
sises four relevant attributes: attention, interest, desire, and action (AIDA). Some 
of the questions assessed whether the subject would be likely to buy the respective 
product. The results of the questionnaire were converted into a format suitable for a 
binary classification model (i.e. Support Vector Machine). Various predictions were 
made for each of the different product types (e.g. car, food, technology, clothes), 
and multiple accuracies were reported (see full text for details). Overall, their study 
achieved an accuracy of 77.28% using EEG data to predict brand perception and 
purchasing intentions.
3.2.4  Inferring Personality
3.2.4.1 Big‑5 Traits (OCEAN) In contemporary personality science, the dominant par-
adigm is the five-factor model, which has been shown to subsume a wide variety of 
other personality scales (McCrae and Costa 1987). The five traits postulated by the 
model are ‘openness’, ‘conscientiousness’, ‘extraversion’, ‘agreeableness’, and ‘neu-
roticism’, collectively known as the Big-5, and often referred to using the acronym 
OCEAN (see Nettle 2009 for an accessible introduction).
There are many studies that show how personality can be predicted from digi-
tal footprints. In a review of these studies, Lambiotte and Kosinski (2014, p. 1934) 
acknowledge that one of the reasons behind this recent interest in personality psy-
chology is that the “[a]bility to automatically assess psychological profiles opens 
the way for improved products and services as personalized search engines, recom-
mender systems, and targeted online marketing”.25
24 Part of their study was also to show how reports of performance for earlier classifiers of political 
orientation trained on social media (e.g. Twitter) were over optimistic because of their reliance on polit-
ically active users. Therefore, they also showed how models trained on individual datasets performed 
poorly when generalised to novel datasets (e.g. model of politically modest users performed with 54% 
accuracy when classifying politicians).
25 Initial evidence from (Matz et al. 2017) seems to support this idea.
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Study 15 We have already introduced the exemplary study produced by Kosin-
ski et al. (2013) (see Case Study 1 for details). In this study, the authors achieved 
the following levels of accuracy for their regression model (measured by the Pear-
son correlation coefficient): openness (0.43); conscientiousness (0.29); extraversion 
(0.4); agreeableness (0.3); neuroticism (0.3).
Study 16 Annalyn et al. (2018) also made use of the MyPersonality dataset, but 
focused on those “likes” that represented books. In combination with data mined 
from the book review site Goodreads.com, they were able to collect user-generated 
tags (i.e. keywords acting as proxies for the books content) for books that Facebook 
users had also liked. These pairings could then be used to test whether book prefer-
ences predicted personality traits. This development allowed the authors to discover 
correlations between genres of books and certain personality traits (e.g. philosoph-
ical-novel and openness: r = 0.25).26 Using Lasso regression on the most predictive 
clusters of book tags, the authors were able to predict the Big-5 traits from book 
preferences to the following degrees  (R2): openness (0.41); conscientiousness 
(0.30); extraversion (0.32); agreeableness (0.34); and neuroticism (0.38).
Study 17 Grover and Mark (2017) tested whether patterns of smartphone and 
computer activity (e.g. usage duration, screen switching patterns), automatically 
collected from logging software, could predict personality traits. Unlike, the previ-
ous two examples, their study utilised a significantly smaller dataset (76 features of 
smartphone usage for 62 participants, each of whom completed the NEO five-factor 
personality inventory). Interestingly, some of the features referred to information 
about the ratio of duration spent on social media to the total usage duration for the 
device, which the authors hypothesised were related to personality traits. Using an 
optimal set of features, the authors trained a Random Forest Classification model 
for each of the five traits using 10-fold cross validation. They reported the following 
average binary classification/AUC values: openness (0.80/0.82); conscientiousness 
(0.65/0.66); extraversion (0.72/0.78); agreeableness (0.72/0.69); and neuroticism 
(0.73/0.72).
Study 18 Finally, Hoppe et  al. (2018) were able to demonstrate that eye move-
ments, measured during a natural-environment exploration study, could reliably 
predict four of the big-five personality traits (conscientiousness, extraversion, agree-
ableness, neuroticism). 42 students were required to walk around campus and pur-
chase any items of their choice from a campus shop. They were also required to 
complete the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (60-item questionnaire). During their time 
exploring the campus, gaze data was tracked and recorded using a head-mounted 
video-based eye tracker, with 207 features subsequently extracted from the gaze 
data, and used to train a Random Forests model for each of the big-five traits. 
The performance of the classifiers was evaluated in terms of an average  F1 score 
across three score ranges, and the following accuracies were achieved: neuroticism 
(40.3%), extraversion (48.6%), agreeableness (45.9%), conscientiousness (43.1%)—
the classifier for openness (30.8%) performed below chance level (33%).
26 There are too many individual tag-trait pairings to report here (see original article for details).
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3.2.4.2 Perceptual Curiosity Perceptual curiosity refers to an individual’s level of 
interest in and reaction to novel stimuli that involve feelings of interest or uncertainty.
Study 19 In addition to predicting four of the five personality traits, Hoppe et al. 
(2018) were also able to predict perceptual curiosity from the acquired gaze data 
(see above). They used the Perceptual Curiosity scale—a self-report questionnaire 
developed by Collins et al. (2004)—as their ground truth. Using the same methodol-
ogy as above, the Random Forest classifier achieved a 37.1% accuracy for predicting 
perceptual curiosity scores.
3.2.5  Inferring (Diagnosing) Disorders and Conditions
3.2.5.1 Autism Diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often involves assess-
ment by a qualified speech and language therapist, due to the close association 
between ASD and abnormal vocal prosody.
Study 20 Nakai et  al. (2017) recruited 30 children diagnosed with ASD by the 
Kobe University Hospital Developmental Behavioral Pediatric Clinic [according 
to DSM-V criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)] and 51 children with 
typical development. They were required to verbally name objects and animals on 
picture cards, and the subsequent audio recordings (24 extracted features) were used 
as the basis for training a Support Vector Machine. The results of the classification 
algorithm were compared against the performance of 10 speech and language thera-
pists, and a  F1 score was used to measure their performance. For the ML algorithm 
and therapist, respectively, the scores were as follows: true-positive rate = 0.81, 
0.54; false-negative rate = 0.19, 0.46; false-positive rate = 0.27, 0.21; true-negative 
rate = 0.073, 0.80. Their experiment demonstrates that a ML algorithm can achieve 
similar levels of accuracy to a qualified specialist, and sometimes outperform them 
(true-positive). However, it should be noted that vocal prosody is only one element 
of a holistic assessment for children with suspected ASD.
3.2.5.2 Depression The DSM-V lists a series of depressive disorders (e.g. major 
depressive disorder), which have the common feature of the “presence of sad, empty, 
or irritable mood, accompanied by somatic and cognitive changes that significantly 
affect the individual’s capacity to function” (American Psychiatric Association 2013). 
A number of psychological assessments exist to measure the severity of symptoms 
associated with depression, including the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depres-
sion Scale (CES-D) (Radloff 1977) and the Beck’s Depression Inventory (Beck et al. 
1961).
Study 21 A research team at Microsoft (De Choudhury et al. 2013), found that 
major depressive disorder could be predicted on the basis of a range of behav-
ioural signals collected from Twitter. These signals include attributes such as 
engagement (e.g. volume of posts; proportion of reply posts), network statistics 
(e.g. ratio of followers and followees, embeddedness within network), emotion 
(measured by psycholinguistic properties through LIWC, see Case Study 2), 
and depressive language (also using LIWC lexicon). 476 participants, recruited 
through Mechanical Turk, were required to complete the self-reported 20-item 
CES-D questionnaire, and were split into two groups based on whether they 
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scored above a certain threshold on the CES-D. The scores and feature vectors 
(derived from Twitter data) were used to train a Support Vector Machine clas-
sification algorithm, which had to correctly classify the users as belonging to one 
of the two classes. Their subsequent model yielded an average accuracy of ~70% 
and high precision of 0.74.
Study 22 Reece and Danforth (2017) extracted features from 43,950 pho-
tographs using colour analysis, metadata components, and algorithmic face 
detection. These photos were taken from the accounts of 166 Instagram users 
(recruited using Mechanical Turk), 71 of whom had a history of depression as 
measured using the CES-D questionnaire. Using a 100-tree Random Forest algo-
rithm to classify depressed users from non-depressed users, they acquired the fol-
lowing levels of prediction accuracy: recall (0.697), specificity (0.478), precision 
(0.604), negative predictive value (0.579),  F1 (0.647).
3.2.5.3 Dyslexia Eye fixation studies have explored how particular patterns of eye 
movements reflect an individual’s difficulty with reading (Hyönä & Olson 1995), 
which may be used to detect dyslexia. The increased presence of webcams, or 
front-facing cameras on smartphones, therefore, presents an opportunity for auto-
mating the detection of dyslexia.
Study 23 Rello and Ballesteros (2015) trained a Support Vector Machine to 
classify Spanish readers with and without dyslexia. 97 subjects were required to 
read 12 different texts and 48 of the subjects had been diagnosed by a human 
expert as having dyslexia. The readings were recorded using eye tracking technol-
ogy, and a variety of features were extracted (e.g. reading time, mean of fixations, 
and age of the participant). Their classifier achieved 80.18% accuracy in a 10-fold 
cross validation experiment.
3.2.5.4 Psychopathy Psychopathy refers to a range of personality disorders, which 
the WHO’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) (World Health Organi-
sation, 2018) defines as “problems in functioning of aspects of the self, and/or 
interpersonal dysfunction that have persisted over an extended period of time”. As 
with personality more generally, psychopathy is manifest in patterns of cognition, 
emotional experience, emotional expression, and behaviour, and is manifest across 
a range of personal and social situations, but is specifically treated as maladaptive.
Study 24 Steele et al. (2017) tested incarcerated youths for psychopathic traits 
using the Hare Psychopath Checklist: Youth Version (PCL: YV) (Hare, 2003), 
administered by trained researchers. Neuroimaging data was also collected for 
each of the individuals, who were subsequently split into three groups based on 
the scores obtained in the test: incarcerated youth with high psychopathy scores 
(HP) (n = 71); incarcerated youth with low psychopathy scores (LP) (n = 72); and 
non-incarcerated youth as healthy controls (HC) (n = 21). Features extracted from 
the neuroimaging data, were used to train Support Vector Machines, and their 
binary classification models obtained the following overall accuracies (additional 
measures are reported in original article): HP versus LP (69.23%); HP versus HC 
(78.26%); LP versus HC (79.57%).
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3.2.5.5 Stress There are many forms of stress, including occupational and psycho-
logical stress, as well as forms of cognitive stress experienced during demanding 
tasks. In mild forms, stress can play an adaptive or motivational role in responding 
to environmental cues (e.g. competitive sports). However, many workers will have 
experience with forms of stress that go beyond its milder forms.
Study 25 Koldijk et al. (2016) tested whether unobtrusive sensors could be used 
to detect occupational stress in offices. They performed multiple experiments and 
extracted various features from four modalities: computer interactions from log files 
(i.e. mouse movement, keyboard usage, and application usage); facial expressions 
from webcams (i.e. head orientation, facial movements, action units, emotion), body 
posture from a Kinect 3D camera (i.e. distance, joint angles, and bone orientations), 
and physiological data (i.e. heart rate variability from ECG and skin conductance). 
Three pre-existing questionnaires were used as ground truth and also compared: the 
NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland 1998), which measures 
perceived workload; the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME) (Zijlstra & van Doorn 
1985), which measures perceived mental workload; the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM) (Bradley & Lang 1994). An initial exploratory study found that mental effort 
could be best predicted, with a correlation of 0.7920. Other variables could also 
be predicted with varying degrees of accuracy: valence (0.7139), arousal (0.7118), 
frustration (0.7117), perceived stress (0.7105), task load (0.6923), temporal demand 
(0.6552). They were able to achieve a higher correlation with mental effort scores 
(0.8416), by utilising a regression tree and using the 25 best features across the vari-
ous modalities—features associated with facial expressions and posture provided the 
most information.
Study 26 Unlike many of the above examples, Vizer et  al. (2009) conducted a 
study that used experimentally-defined conditions as the ground truth for their ML 
algorithms. They set up five conditions grouped into cognitive stress (i.e. mental 
multiplication and number recall tasks), physical stress (cardiovascular exercise 
and resistance exercise) and a control situation. These task labels were used in 
the supervised ML task. In each of the three conditions, subjects were required to 
spontaneously generate text through keyboard input, and a range of features associ-
ated with typing patterns and linguistic patterns were extracted. The two best clas-
sification models for physical stress (artificial neural network) and cognitive stress 
(kNN), achieved accuracies (reported using the AUC measure) of 0.625 and 0.75 
respectively.
4  Discussion
Our review was undertaken in order to answer the question ‘can machines infer 
(probabilistic) information about the psychological traits or mental states of individ-
ual users, on the basis of samples of their behaviour?’ The findings in the previous 
section support an affirmative answer to this question for a variety of psychological 
constructs. This demonstrates that particular samples of behaviour are sufficient, in 
some instances, when the machine has been trained on the data referring to the psy-
chological values and behavioural signals of a large number of other people (i.e. the 
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set of pairs ⟨Pi, Bi⟩ ). It follows that some of our online behaviour, if analysed in the 
context of a large ‘normative group’ (or training set), discloses personal (sometimes 
private) information about our mental states and psychological traits.
As we indicated in the introduction, this raises a number of considerations about 
what one can and should do when they have access to the aforementioned informa-
tion—specifically whether an autonomous intelligent system could utilise this infor-
mation to control a user’s behaviour. In Sect. 4.1 we present the following actions 
as relevant to this first consideration: diagnose, predict, persuade and (more specu-
latively) control. In principle, these actions can be taken without active participa-
tion or explicit consent of the individuals concerned—we discuss these issues in 
Sect. 4.2.
In addition, our review also demonstrates that samples of online behaviour can 
be used to segment users into groups that share some psychological trait or mental 
state (e.g. group of users with high levels of depression). If we assume that the algo-
rithm could access other samples of behaviour, or combine current signals in linked 
datasets, it is possible that ML techniques, such as unsupervised learning, may in the 
future find more effective criteria for grouping subjects together than have currently 
been discovered. These, as of yet, unnamed traits may still have psychological reli-
ability, and perhaps validity, without belonging to our established lexicon. Although 
the consequences of these technologies for the future of psychometrics is not a key 
aspect of this paper—we focus on traditional forms of psychological assessment 
primarily to simplify our discussion—it is clear that the wider research commu-
nity need to address the consequences of machines reading the minds of their users, 
whether they are known or unknown to current psychological science. Therefore, we 
also briefly discuss the connection between ML and psychometrics in Sect. 4.3.
4.1  What can be done with the inferred knowledge?
Given that machines can infer information about our psychological traits and mental 
states, it is important to consider what can (and should) be done on the basis of this 
information. Four categories are useful for discussing this point: diagnosis, predic-
tion, persuasion, and (more speculatively) control. The first two represent passive 
forms of knowledge acquisition, whereas the final two introduce forms of interven-
tion or action, conditional on some information pertaining to a user’s psychological 
traits or mental states.
4.1.1  Diagnosis
Our review explored a number of cases where diagnosis of certain psychopathol-
ogies (e.g. depression and psychopathy) and other mental disorders or conditions 
could be bypassed by using ML algorithms, trained on relevant data. ML-based 
diagnosis is of significant interest within the medical community (e.g. DeepMind 
Health in the UK), because of the obvious benefits that improved levels of reliability 
can bring. However, diagnostic information can also be valuable to other organisa-
tions, such as health insurance companies, dating or gambling websites, or in hiring 
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decisions made by employers (e.g. whether to offer a job to an individual with high 
levels of depression).27
In all of these cases, diagnosis is typically a first step in a larger process of con-
sequential decision-making, and depending on the subsequent decision, particular 
diagnoses can have significant practical consequences for the individual concerned 
(e.g. ‘what, if any, treatment option should be given?’; ‘should a particular candidate 
be hired?’). Therefore, it is important to consider the reliability and validity of any 
diagnosis in connection with the domain in which it is used. For example, one could 
argue that the use of ML-based medical diagnosis for the purpose of determining 
treatment options should require a much higher level of accuracy than alternative 
applications (e.g. advertising mindfulness apps or holidays to subjects displaying 
high levels of stress).
4.1.2  Prediction
Prediction utilises historical data (e.g. samples of behaviour) in order to predict 
the outcome of future events, on the assumption that certain statistical patterns are 
likely to recur. For example, this could be the likelihood of a user purchasing some 
product (conditional on some set of past purchases), or it could be the chance of an 
individual voting for a political candidate (conditional on the inferred values of their 
political attitudes or orientation).
Machine predictions are typically probabilistic in nature, and are often connected 
with a corresponding risk score (e.g. risk of defaulting in the case of loans and mort-
gages; risk of dropping out or quitting in college and job admissions; risk of recidi-
vism in criminal justice decisions). As such, many communities are keenly inter-
ested in whether these predictions can be improved, and whether (and how) new 
forms of data-driven ML can assist. However, the considerations that prediction 
raises for each community are not necessarily shared. For example, the tolerance for 
risk varies across domain (e.g. insurance versus criminal justice) and risk-weighted 
predictions must reflect the prevailing attitudes of the community. Secondly, it may 
be unethical to treat predictions concerning individuals displaying psychopathologi-
cal states in the same way as those for neurotypical individuals.
4.1.3  Persuasion
Action is a key ingredient in the generation of control systems and feedback loops. 
An intelligent system that has access to our mental states, in the context of other 
valuable data, can take actions that are designed to steer an individual’s behaviour 
towards particular goals, while also monitoring feedback from its actions (i.e. the 
27 Chamorro-Premuzic et  al. (2016, 2017) discuss the growing interest in big data analytics in hiring 
decisions and human resource management, along with the possibility of using digital fingerprints and 
gamified assessments as alternative samples of behaviour to supplement traditional job assessment meth-
ods. We do not include this work in the above review because many of the techniques are proprietary and 
the companies involved are not required to disclose the validity or reliability of their tools.
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subsequent actions taken by the human user). This process can create a feedback 
loop, enabling an intelligent system to update its model regarding the probability of 
whether some future action will be effective in reaching its goal.
In the case of persuasion, for example, an intelligent system could use infor-
mation about an individual’s mental states for various ends. In one instance, Matz 
et al. (2017) show how personality can be used to more effectively target persuasive 
advertising messages that are expected to increase sales. And, in another, Lin et al. 
(2017) developed an app that can detect problematic usage based of smartphone 
usage patterns (daily use/non-use frequency, and duration of usage), which could in 
turn enable developers to nudge users who are at risk of smartphone addiction, with 
reminders about their usage.28
4.1.4  Control
Many in the area of positive computing—an offshoot of the more general area of 
positive psychology—have already begun exploring whether technology could be 
used to make people happier by promoting psychological traits and attributes such 
as positive emotions, self-awareness, motivation, engagement, mindfulness, empa-
thy, and compassion, through value-sensitive design (Calvo & Peters 2014). A final 
(more speculative) consideration is the possibility of directly controlling an individ-
ual’s mental state, such as those explored by positive computing.
By this, we mean a machine that continuously measures an individual’s mental 
state and takes actions that are designed to directly control the associated variable 
(i.e. the latent variable), rather than simply trying to steer their behaviour through 
unmonitored persuasive appeals (e.g. nudges). Such attempts at control could have 
enormous benefits to individual and social levels of well-being, and many studies 
have begun to explore technology- or internet-based forms of medical intervention 
(i.e. therapeutic or promotional efforts to improve physical or mental health) (Calvo 
& Peters 2014). However, another example is a study conducted by a research team 
at Facebook (Kramer et al. 2014), which involved attempts at controlling the emo-
tional states of users of the social media platform. News feeds of certain users were 
manipulated to show a greater proportion of positive or negative emotional con-
tent, in order to test levels of emotional contagion (i.e. the degree to which emo-
tional states are transferred to others). Some users’ news feeds were filtered to only 
see positive or negative emotional content, and the study found that when positive 
expressions of emotion were reduced, people produced fewer positive posts and 
more negative posts; when negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pat-
tern occurred. This is problematic. As is well-understood in control theory, minor 
increases in the level of inaccuracy associated with the estimation of state variables 
(i.e. inference of latent traits) can lead to drastic variation in the variables following 
28 Although Lin et al. (2017) considered their app-derived parameters alongside psychiatric diagnoses, 
and also conducted a separate validation of the the Smartphone Addiction Inventory (Lin et al. 2014), 
the existence of smartphone addiction is not included in manuals such as the DSM-V, and so it was not 
included in the main review (Sect. 3).
1 3
Can Machines Read our Minds? 
attempted control (e.g. nonlinear control problem of a trailer reversing), especially 
in cases of positive feedback loops. As such, there are a number of potential dangers 
from the misuse of the aforementioned technologies, if designed to (probabilisti-
cally) control a user’s mental state on the basis of inaccurate information or con-
troversial theoretical assumptions, such as a potentially restrictive taxonomy (e.g. 
restrictive taxonomy of distinct emotional states).
These consequences require careful discussion of the ethical, legal, and social 
issues that emerge from use of machines that can read our minds (Burr et al. 2018). 
We turn to discuss some specific cases now.
4.2  Consent and Trust
As we act we constantly leak information about our goals, beliefs, orientations, 
mental states, and psychological traits. An analysis of our behaviour, if combined 
with sufficient data from a normative group, may allow learning algorithms to infer 
this information. It seems that several independent research communities have fol-
lowed a similar trend in exploring this possibility. The result is that this technology 
is emerging without coordinated oversight.
In our review, we did not make a distinction between cases where the subject 
is willing or cooperating and the cases where the subject is unaware or opposed to 
the assessment. In principle, many of the methods could be performed on unknow-
ing or unwilling subjects, for whom the relevant samples of behaviour have been 
gathered.29 The issue of consent has already been extensively discussed and debated 
(Boyd & Crawford 2012; Ioannidis 2013), and has influenced new forms of regula-
tion, such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which seeks to restrict the collection and use of data (e.g. requirement of explicit 
consent).30
However, in relation to the ethical implications that arise from inferring a user’s 
mental state or psychological traits on the basis of some digital sample of behav-
iour, the issue of consent should not be discussed as a general principle, because 
specific uses of inferred knowledge will likely lead to differing ethical concerns. For 
example, individuals may not view a lack of consent as particularly concerning in 
cases where the inferred information is simply used for choosing which advertise-
ment to display (e.g. persuasion). However, if the information is used in an attempt 
29 Specific instances of data collection without consent have been reported. For example, Purnell (2018) 
reports that a London-based security firm uncovered a smartphone app that is pre-installed on devices 
in Myanmar, Cambodia, Brazil, India, and China, which automatically collects and transmits personal 
information (e.g. device information, location information) without the user’s knowledge to a mobile-
advertising firm.
30 For example, recital 32 of the GDPR, which clarifies the definition of ‘consent’, states, “Consent 
should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambigu-
ous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, 
such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement.” (European Commis-
sion 2016).
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to (probabilistically) control the user’s mental state, individuals may likely view 
the lack of consent as deeply problematic due to overlooking or not respecting their 
autonomy.
Furthermore, it is not always clear how much understanding a user may have 
about (a) the information being collected about their online activities, and (b) the 
types of uses (i.e. diagnosis, prediction, persuasion, or control) the data is collected 
for. The urgency of this issue has been re-emphasised recently, following the pub-
lication of a report from a research team at Vanderbilt University (Schmidt 2018). 
The report details a number of experiments in which a new Android smartphone was 
monitored to determine the scope and type of data that is sent to Google’s servers. 
Importantly, the study found that two-thirds of the data collected is by passive means 
(i.e. without user input), and thus possibly without the user’s knowledge or explicit 
consent. In one experiment, the study found that an Android device left idle with no 
user interaction sent ~900 data samples were sent to a variety of Google’s servers 
over 340 instances and across a 24-hour period. When actively used, this amount 
of data collection rose to approximately 450 instances (1.4 × the passive amount). 
The type of this data was varied, including personally identifying information (e.g. 
user name, birthdate, zip code, gender, device identifiers) as well as a range of 
behavioural information (e.g. websites visited, apps used, purchases made). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, location information constituted 35% of all the data samples sent to 
Google, as much of this can be used for advertising purposes. However, it can also 
be used to determine higher-level behavioral characteristics such as whether a user is 
walking, cycling, running, etc. Finally, the report states that “Google identified user 
interests with remarkable accuracy” (ibid., p. 3), and that their findings “indicate 
that Google has the ability to connect the anonymous data collected through passive 
means with the personal information of the user.” (ibid., p. 4). Although the study’s 
authors used Google’s privacy policies as a source of information about the type of 
data collection that occurs, it was not sufficient on its own to allow them to deter-
mine the full extent of the data collection. It should therefore be clear why the type 
of user consent that can be gathered through privacy policies is not enough.
A related consideration arises for the matter of trust. Psychometrics rests on 
prior theoretical assumptions about why a particular test measures some postulated 
construct. Many of the studies in our review demonstrate surprising correlations 
between samples of (public) behaviour and (private) psychological information, 
which is connected with a key concept in psychological assessment known as face 
validity (i.e. the degree to which a test is subjectively viewed as establishing a sound 
basis for measuring the postulated construct). Face validity is important in establish-
ing trust between test administrators and participants, and the use of digital foot-
prints for bypassing tests may undermine this trust (e.g. would a participant accept 
that their gaze data is a strong predictor of personality?). Like consent, this may be 
problematic to differing degrees in certain domains. For example, an employer may 
risk upsetting potential candidates by using non-traditional forms of assessment, 
which despite having high predictive accuracy according to some criterion (e.g. job 
performance), are not evaluated by the candidate as being valid assessment tools.
These considerations highlight a need for the relevant research communities, and 
the organisations using the aforementioned techniques, to carefully consider the 
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specific ethical issues that arise in the inference of particular mental states and psy-
chological traits—it is unlikely that broad, all-encompassing principles will suffice.
4.3  From Galton to Google; from Fechner to Facebook
Our paper is primarily concerned with showing how many of the methods used in 
psychological assessment can be bypassed, rather than replaced, by utilising ML 
techniques. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile taking the opportunity to briefly con-
sider some of the consequences that ML may have for the ongoing development and 
application of psychological assessment.
Firstly, a quick terminological note on psychometrics. The dominant paradigm in 
psychometrics is item response theory (IRT), a statistical framework that models the 
relationship between the degree to which an individual’s possesses some proposed 
construct (e.g. a trait, often represented by the greek letter ‘θ’) and their subsequent 
performance (response) on a set of items in a given psychometric test (Rust and 
Golombok 2009).
In IRT, every choice reveals information about a latent variable (θ), under the 
assumption of conditional independence of choices. Internal calibration (reliability) 
allows us to know the probability distribution of responses given the latent trait (e.g. 
the distribution of scores to some item × among extroverts). As already noted, this 
process is very similar to a class of problems known as “inverse problems” where a 
hidden (or latent) cause needs to be inferred (or postulated) based on its observable 
effects. While generally “ill-posed”, in practice this class of problems can often be 
solved, under the appropriate assumptions.
Importantly, an ‘item’ is defined by the Standards for Educational and Psycho-
logical Assessment as “a statement, question, exercise, or task on a test for which 
the test taker is to select or construct a response, or perform a task” (American Edu-
cational Research Association et al. 2014, p. 220). This means that in principle, an 
online behaviour could constitute an item response, under certain assumptions (see 
LIWC case study, Sect. 2.2).
Furthermore, in IRT the reliability and validity of psychometric assessments can 
also be evaluated statistically. Validity is “the degree to which accumulated evi-
dence and theory support a specific interpretation of test scores for a given use of a 
test.” (American Educational Research Association et al. 2014, p. 225). In short, a 
valid measure is one that measures what it is intended to measure. Reliability is “the 
degree to which test scores for a group of test takers are consistent over repeated 
applications of a measurement procedure and hence are inferred to be dependable 
and consistent for an individual test takers.” (American Educational Research Asso-
ciation et al. 2014, p. 223)
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The statistical nature of IRT means that ML would be well-posed to automate 
many (but not all) aspects of the assessment process.31 Indeed, others have already 
argued that “principles and techniques from the field of machine learning can help 
psychology become a more predictive science” (Yarkoni and Westfall 2017). How-
ever, as previously noted, the impact of ML on the theoretical development of psy-
chometrics is beyond the scope of this article.
Returning to the consequences of ML techniques for the development and appli-
cation of psychological assessment, one obvious point is that as new datasets are 
collected, we may find better signals that predict the various constructs we covered 
in our review, or maybe enable researchers to predict abilities that we have not con-
sidered (e.g. numerical and spatial reasoning). This means that datasets that have 
already been collected, without appropriate regulatory oversight, could be re-mined 
and analysed for additional psychological insights.
Another possibility is that existing datasets could be linked together, increasing 
the reliability and validity of current techniques. As Luhmann (2017, p. 30) states, 
with regards to a review of big data assessments of subjective well-being: “To date, 
no single data source seems reliable and valid enough to replace traditional self-
report measures of well-being. However, this may change as more data sources are 
developed, validated, and combined.”
By linking datasets together, we may also find further latent traits that are unin-
terpretable by traditional psychological standards—techniques for unsupervised 
learning will likely prove to be invaluable in this regard. These undiscovered traits 
may turn out to be better predictors of behaviour, which would have obvious finan-
cial benefit for many organisations that are unconcerned with theoretical constraints 
such as construct validation, and merely wish to improve their ability to influence 
user behaviour. Such developments could likely exacerbate ethical concerns as a 
result of linking certain datasets (e.g. measuring the probability of anxiety among 
conservatives, and using this information to develop particular campaign strategies; 
incorrectly detecting positive emotions in individuals suffering from depression and 
withholding necessary treatment).
As is to be expected, it is clear that there are possible advantages and disadvan-
tages for how this technology could be developed and utilised. Because of the wide-
reaching effects of these technologies, it is imperative that ongoing communication 
between the various communities continues—it is our hope that the current paper 
demonstrates the importance of ongoing collaboration.
31 See Alexandrova and Haybron (2016) for a discussion of the epistemological and methodological 
nature of construct validation, including an argument in favour of the “coherentist logic” that underpins 
it. This aspect of psychometrics is perhaps the most resistant to automation or replacement by machine 
learning techniques.
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5  Conclusion
Current technologies can already infer probabilistic information about our men-
tal states and psychological traits, and classify us in ways that bypass traditional 
forms of psychological assessment. Our review identifies just a portion of the 
many studies in which different types of behavioural samples can be used by 
an algorithm to read our minds. Many more methods are still being studied and 
developed across different communities for the same purpose.
As the types and amount of interaction between us and our online devices 
increases, and as new types of sensors for measuring behavioural signals are 
developed, there is the expectation that by combining these sources of informa-
tion a ML algorithm could form a very accurate image about us.
The likely convergence of these technologies and methods raises many ethical 
issues—beyond the topics of consent and trust that we have explored. Most nota-
bly, there are the risks associated with enabling intelligent systems to take actions 
that aim to control our behaviour, on the basis of inferred psychological informa-
tion (Burr et al. 2018). These issues will not be solved entirely by legislation, and 
the individual research communities reviewed should not be expected to develop 
ethical guidelines on their own. Rather, it is imperative that policymakers and 
researchers understand the scope of these developments, in order to better facili-
tate the ongoing discussions about the growing use and convergence of machines 
that can read our minds and control our behaviours.
We believe that the pace of progress is such that looking at the work of multi-
ple communities within a unified framework can help understand how much pro-
gress has been made, and may help us better see what is currently occurring and 
may continue to emerge in the near future.
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